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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
.TACK 0. COFFIN AND LEONE

A. COFFIN, his ·wife,

Plni11tif f s and Respondents,

-vs-

CI:L\_TILES E. DEGRAFFENRIED,
and IR~LADELL DEGRAFFENHIED. his wife, and C. ED\VARD
llEUHAFFENRIED, also known as
C'IL\HLES E DEGRAFFENRIED
and as CHARLES E. DEGRAFFEi;RIED, .JR., and PAMELA
DEGHAFFI._;XRIED, his wife,

Case No.
10528

Def rndants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF JACK 0. COFFIN and LEONE A.
COFFIN, PLAINTIFFS AND RESPOXDAXTR.

STATE~1EXT

OF KATFRE OF CASE

This is an action to
Th<• tnw loeation of the
\\as one isslw, including
loeatio11 lJy tlw County
ill () ni lll 1<' 1l t .

<1uiet title to about two acres.
11oundary between the parties
the efft.•ct, if any, of the n'SnrY<>yor of the• lost smTP~'
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COUR'l"T
The trial court found in favor of Plaintiffs and
against Defendants and awarded a decree quieting titlr
in Plaintiffs and granted damages against Defendant~
for trespass.

RELIEE1 SOUGHT
The Appellants seek to reverse the lower court, hut
Plaintiffs, as Respondents, request that the Finding~
and the Decree of the trial court be affirmed and that
they be awarded their costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We believe that vital and material facts are not included in Appellants' statement in their brief, hence \YP
will summarize those which appear necessary for this
Court to have a full and complete understanding of tlw
facts at issue and the legal conclusions reachPd.
The very first exhibit (P-1) is a deed dateu .l\lay 1:3~
1952, by which Plaintiffs took title. This deed from
Harold Lee Hogers conveyed to them "All that portion
of the following described tract of land which lies East
of the center line of the Beckstead Ditch, to-wit:" and
then a lengthy metes and bounds description follO\rs.

3
This tics to the County Road on the North and the J ordan Jfrn~r on the East. The South line coincides with a
long established fence which is not in dispute.
Plaintiffs took possession and requested l\Ir. David
I. Oardner to make a survey shortly after their 1952
imrehase. He delayed surveying until the quarter corner
1110nu11H~nt could be reestablished as its location was lost.
Later tlH-' Salt Lake County Surveyor did reestablish
suf'h corner and set a ·witness monument for survey pur1ioses. Then, early in l\Iarch, 195G, l\fr. Gardner surveyed
tlte vro1wrty and prepared a new legal description which
\ras usPd in a second deed from :Mr. Rogers to Plaintiffs
\Exhibit P-2) dated September 29, 195G, which was given
to eonPct any indPfinitP portions of the 1952 dePd.
Plaintiffs had been in possession from 1952 when
1ll 1%1 the Dt•fpndants procured a Quit Claim Deed
i Exhibit P-19) from l\lcCollough Investment Company
datPd August :2-±, 19G2. r:rhis was the old \Vhite Fawn
l;'lour Mill on 106th South, west of the .Jordan River.
TliPrtiafttir Def endanfa took possession and the next
.Year Pnquired of the Plaintiffs as to the boundary line
IJPtW('Pll t1H-'ir rPSp(•ctive properties. 1 hey ·were advised
1

of the Gardner smTey and the stakes and they inspectPd

tliP Jll'OJiPrty togetltt>r (R. 1:2:3). Defendants ·wanted to

('l't>C't a fenee and the partit>s discussed having a nPw
Sl1l'\"<'Y

and Defrndant "said that he would have th<>

p:rnund surYPyr>d and that lH' would lw willing to

ahid<~
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by the engineer's survey after it - this survey 1rns lllad0,
but he wouldn't accept the survey as I had it". (R Ul).
Thereafter, Defendants hired l\lr. Brad Gardner
to make a new survey. This 1yas done and stakes wtirP
set. A short time later in 19G3 Plaintiffs observed D1'fendants busy building a fence some 90 feet South of thl'
survey stakes. (See photographs, Exhibits P-11 and
P-20). Plaintiffs objected hut the Defendants complettid
the fence and said they'd let the eourt sPttle thP matt<·r.
(R. 12G).
There had never been a fence whPre this new one
was located during the period from 1952 to 19G:1, during
which Plaintiffs had occupi(~d the propert_\·. ( H. l:!ti).
Mr. David I. Gardner, who had been very familiar with
the property since 1915 and from 193G on wPnt on tlw
property regularly in mt>asuring water in the BPckstead
Ditch, testified that there had never been a fence 1i·lterl'
Defendants erected this nPw om'. (R. ffi7-11)8).
Following the Brad Gardner survey for D('G raffrnrieds in 19G2, the fence was erectPd hy Defendants by
which they appropriated about two acres of Plaintiffs'
land. A composite map was prepared lat<>r lJy .'..\.! r. Da-rid
I. Gardner (Exhihit P-17) which refleeted tlte <1l•scription in thP 193G Rogers d<-'Nl to Plaintiffs and tlw 1%1
:McCollough Quit (;laim d(•ed to Defondants. Th:s show:-.
tho relationship of the n•eord titlPs of tlie parti<'~
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and there has been sketched on it the location of the new
frnce which Defendants arbitrarily erected. No conflict
in legal titles exist and each desc1iption was tied to the
rdocated East quarter corner monument of Section 14.
1 Both deeds ,,·ere prepared after the County Surveyor
had relocated said corner).
'rl1e Plaintiff testified that from 1952 on until time
of trial ltP ltad paid all taxes assessed on the property
~md hall made such payments prior to delinquency each
:·ear. E:x.hihit P-18 reflects a number of such tax notices
(lul:· rec·1c'ipted. Plaintiffs had possession of their deeded
a n-·a lwhn"Pn the Beckstead Ditch and the J O·rdan River
from 19:)~ until ousted by Defendants in 1963 of the two
acres in disput0. Plaintiffs still occupy the residue of
tllPir land.
E:x.hilJit P-11 clParly shows the location of the Beck~~Pacl Ditch on tlw }Vest and the .Jordan River on the
F(lsf as well as the rdationship of the County Road
I lO<ith South Stred) and the uncontested fence line ext\'ncling from the Becksh•ad Ditch to the Jordan River
along tl1e Nouth lim• of Plaintiffs' propPrty as n•flected
Ii."· t:l('ir hrn d(·Pds. .Judge A. JI. Elll'tt had said Pxhihit
; nd otlwrs lwfor(• l1im \dwn he wPnt out alonp during tlH'
1·orn·sp of trial to olisP1Te pe;·sonally thP land. the natural
l1l<llll 1 ill!'1Jt;; ;rnd tJi1• f Pl1<'!'S.
l>\'i'(·JHlanb' n:idP1H'(' confirms tlw agreeuwnt to
a1:i<l,· Ii\ tl1(• HrnJ Can11w1 srn·y(·!· and tl!Pir <lt>fiant

e-rection of the fence encompassing Plaintiffs' two ac:rec;.
Some ancient rt>sidents \Yc re called in to kstify tliat in
former days before the old flour mill ceased opera ti on:-:,
horses had been pastured hy the mill to the South of thP
mill race. No testimony was giYen as to wheth(_'f this \':a.'
or ,,-as not permissive. l\Ir. lfonnan YounglJerg bought
the property in 19:20 but he ow1wd both piece's tlt(·n (lL
2±4). l\fr. Henry Parduken \rnrked at the mill and tended
the horses from J 907 and for 2-t )'Pars. 1-fr i11oved in
J 931 to American Fork. The Court ask<><l him if h(' Jiad
even seen any stakes South of tlic> mill and lH' ;-:aid "]
haven't noticPd them". (R 2-i::n.
1

No boundary by aC(lllll'seenee rnsue was evidPnt n~
no one could or did tt>stify as to 1dH'll or wlwn· tlH' olil
fence was lo.cate<l, esCPlJt in v<>1·y gc'm'nd t<•nus and n 1
testimony \\-as lll'Psented as to a basis for nPdio11 of
the old corral if it t>xist('d. :Jir. David L U anlw'l' <:<·ni<·d
its vrry PxistPnf'('.
1

l\Ir. A. Helf bought the prnperty in 19-i:J nnd fanued
it for about 5 years and tlwn sold in lD-iS to Plaintiff~·
predecessor. Ht> testified that there was no frnce dnrin~·
said period. (R. '.2~37). He did ohs<'l'Y<' two old pipPs in
the ground. Thus from Dt>fen<lants' o\\'n wit1wsses it i'
apparent that tlt0re
vreeted this

Ill'\\'

11C'V<'l'

\ms a f Pnce \\'here Ddemlant~

mw for at lea;-:t :20 )·ears prior to 1%:~.

r:rhe h•stimon)· is that this was on open f'iehl 1mti l Tkf<·ndants' fencP 1rns hnilt in Flli:i_
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS WERE IN POSSESSION AND HAD
BEEN SINCE 1952 WHEN DEFENDANTS PURCHASED ADJOINING PORPERY IN 1961. HENCE
DEFENDANTS TOOK SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFFS'
PRIOR TITLE AND POSSESSION.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS HAD POSSESSION AND PAID TIMELY ALL TAXES AS ASSESSED FROM 1952 TO

DATE OF DEFENDANTS' WRONGFUL ERECTION
OF FENCE IN MAY 1963.

From the time of their purchase in 1952, the Plaintiffs took possession and utilized the property. Primarily
the area was grazed though some crops were planted.
The Beckstead Ditch is the westerly boundary and required no fence there to keep livestock in. The Jordan
HiYer is the easterly boundary and required no fence.
Along the soutlH'l'ly line from the Beckstead Ditch to
the .J orclan Hiver \Vas and is a fence which has been long
Pstalilished. On the north is the property boungh by Def(•nclanb. A millrace runs from the Beckstead Ditch to
the .Jordan Hiver and is of such width and depth as to
kl·e1J liYtst(wk from crossmg.
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Thus when Plaintiffs to.ok poss(•ssion in HJ3:2 tlit·~1,
four substantial enclosure and bonndary marken.; exil'tP11
and no additional fencing was required. LiYestoek gnu.1·d
the entire area until excluded by the HlG3 frne0 ('l'l'd1·il
by the Defendants. During this eJeyen (11) year perifJr!.
the Plaintiffs paid all taxes assessed and paid sueh l'U~l1
year before November 30th.

If we understand the Defendants' 1rnsition in tlti~
regard, they contend that no valid possession and p2,1ment of taxes could occur until aftN· tlu_• SqJkrnlin
1956 correctory deed had been n·co.rded and the Count~··,
records changed in 1957. '11 hey com1mte 1957 to tlw tnw
of Defendants' wrongful erection of the fonet' in ::\lay
1963, as less than the required seven y<:•ars for adwr~1·
possess10n.
Apparently the Defendants want to forgd that Plaintiffs' possession and payment of all taxes goes hack tc
1952. Our statutes on quiet title actions and r<'lnti<
limitations clearly set forth a seven year period:
Section 78-12-G, UCA 1953
Section 78-12-S, FCA
Sc~ction

195:~

73-12-12, FCA rn5:{

Plaintiffs took JHJBSC'S8ion under their <fp<•d in 19.i~
which encompassed the entin~ an•a (lwbn•<m the lk·:-k-
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;:;tead Ditch on the west and the Jordan River on the
East) and hence are entitled to the benefit of Section
78-12-9 UCA 1953. This deed was recorded in 1952 and
possession was taken that year. This statute reads:
''For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by any person claiming a title founded
upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and
oeeupied in the following cases:
1. \Vhere it has been usually cultivated or
improved.
2. \Vhere it has been protected by a substantial in closure.

3. \Vhere, although not inclose<l, it has been
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing
timber for the purpose of husbandry, or
for pasturage or for the ordinary use of
the occupant.
J. \Vhere a known fann O·r single lot has
heen partly improved, the portion of such
farm or lot that may have been left not
cl(•ared or not inclosed according to the
usual course and custom of the adjoining
county is deemed to have been occupied
for the same length of time as tlw part
improved and cultivatf'd."

-What portions of said ::statute are t'StablishPd by tlw
evidPncP 'I The property has been cultivated part of tlw
tirnt>. Tt has ''h<>en protPcted by a substantial encloun;e"
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at all times as the animals have been confined by the
Beckstead Ditch on the vV est, the 1\Jillrace on the North,
and the Jordan River on the East and the barbed \rinfence all along the South line. It has been used frorn
1952 on "for pasturage or for the ordinary use of th~
occupant."
Nine years after Plaintiffs took possession, Defendants bought the land and flour mill to the .North. They
knew Plaintiffs ·were in possession. Both the 1952 and
the 1956 deeds were of record. Survey stakes were still
in place. The property was being cultivated and pa~
tured. These Defendants should be estopped from their
claims now both because of their constructive and actual
knowledge of Plaintiffs' o-wnersfop and by their concluet
follmving their conference ·with Plaintiffs at the property.
In 1962 the Defendants suggested that a fence should
he built and agreed that they'd have Brad Gardner makt·
a survey for them as they did not want to accept tlie
David I. Gardner survey of Plaintiffs' property. Defendants then hired Brad Gardner, agreeing the abide by
his survey. He surveyed Defendant's property and put
in the corner stakes. Then Defendants, still unlwlirving
the survey stakes, arbitrarily built tlw f pnce 90 feet to
the South and appropriated two acres of Plaintiffs'
property.
Judge A. H. Ellett took time to drive out to thE'
property during the coun;;p of the trial. HP oh~wrvP<l tlw
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location of the "water boundaries" on three sides, Beckstead Ditch, Mill Race, and Jordan River, and the old
fence on the south side. Also he saw the new fence erected
hy Defendants in 1963.
Thereafter, at conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence, a
motion to dismiss was mad~. Judge Ellett said:
"THE COURT: I had better not do that 'vith
the surveyor telling me he surveyed the inside of
the lines according to the deed, and with the further testimony of the party that he's paid taxes
for eleven years on this thing and has used it
up until two, over two years ago. I had better
not do it. I will deny your motion. Put your <>vidence on." (Tr. 201)
This statement by the Court summarizes ·well the
position of Plaintiffs:
(a) They were in possession under the 1952
dPed;
( h) They properly paid all taxes from 1952
to time of trial;
( e) rrhe survey in 195G by David I. Gardner
was inside of the lines of the J 952 deed;
( d) rrhe new deed in 193G was based upon
that survey and hence did not expand Plaintiffs'
title:
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( e) Eleven years of tax payment and posse~
sion by Plaintiffs preceded defendants erection
of the fence which took away plaintiffs' two
acres;
(f) The fence building by Defendants wa~
after the Brad Gardner survey and was considerably south of defendants' south line as shown Ly
said survey stakes (R. 199);
( g) No other surveys than the two separat<'
Gardner surveys had been made before def rndants built their fence.

title.

(h) Defendants have not proved a rPcord

Though the law on titles of this nature seems to be
well settled in Utah, let us review a f(-'W pertirn=>nt pronouncements :
In Adams v. Lamicq 221 P.2d, 1037, 118 Ut. 209~
it was held as to an adverse claimant -..rho grazed tlw
land only five-six months per year, that use of such
character (in the language o.f the statute) is adequat(• if
the dominion and control is "for pasturage or for ordinary use of the occupant". A California case is quotPd to
show that ev"ryday pasturage is not essential.
In Cooper vs. Carter Oil C01npa11.zJ, i3 L() P. 2d. ~i29, 7
1~tah

2d. 9, it was held:
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(a) Color of title was had when possesion was
taken in 19±3 under a contract from the County even
though the County Deed was not issued until 1947; and
(b) actual knowledge of party's possession established his claim of adverse possession to grazing lands
which ,,·rre actually occupied only three weeks each year.
Defendants in their brief have cited cases saying
that the purpose of paying taxes for seven years (rather
than redemption) is to give notice of adverse claims.
\\' e have no disagreement ·with the proposition. Such
cases are inapplicable here as the taxes have been paid
by plaintiffs since 1952 each year before the delinquency
date and the plaintiffs had possession from 1952 on. In
fact, plaintiffs had been in continuous, open and adverse
possession for nine years before defendants ever bought
their property. No cases need be cited to establish that
ow~ buys subject to rights of parties in possession.
Pt•rhaps the fact that .McCullough Investment Com1mny, whose claim to ownership is not even in evidence,
would only give defendants a quit claim deed ought to
have alerkd them to possible adverse claims. The very
open possession of plaintiffs at the time of purchase by
defondants in 19Gl obviates any nePd for constructiv(~
notie1• thnn:p;h tax records.

rl'Jw Cc.urt's Findings (R. 100) on this rnatt(•r read:
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"Since 1952 the plaintiffs have paid all of t]11>
taxes assessed against said property, prior t0
November 30 of each yPar, as the same• haw hPPJ!
assessed, and since 193G have occupied, culfrratPrl
and claimed the entire property, in ]Hll'Sl1<llh'P o:
their deeds, under a claim of right, including tlir,
area in dispute, until the Plaintiffs ,,-Pre onstt·d
from their Jrnssession of the pro1wrty by a frrn·'"
<'r(>rtPd h.\- thP Defendants in April of 1~Hi:l."
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS ARE RECORD TITLE O\VNERS OF
AREA AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY SURVEYOR
LAWFULLY REESTABLISHED THE SURVEY CORNER.

NO\\' \\-e've talked ahout the basis of Ow Co.mt'~
Findings and JudgrnPnt of an advenw titl(' has('d upon
over seven years use and oceupaney undn a \\Titt!'n i11strument and payment of all taxes assess. By cloing 80,
we do not waive Paintiffs' other position t1iat the:- an·
the record title owners and hence ('ntitlc·d to a de('l'Pl'
flUiPting tlwir title on that basis.
'11 he ahstract of title (Exhibit r-J3) together "·ith
the deeds, (Exhibits P-1 and P-'.2) 0stuhlish a clPar ehain
of title from time of patent to time of trial. J)pfc'nclants'
Quit Claim D<'ed (P-19) ties to an olJ "row or tn•<'s",

"adolw wall'', "brush and 11<><lg<• frnc(•", ''larp,0 irater
dit«h", Pte. F'rnm this 1lit·Y USS('J't tliat

1!:1•S(

1

1l10i11Jll[('Jlt:'
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snpercede all other rights of Plaintiffs. The Defendants' abstract, Exhibit D-14, 'ms last brought to
date April 3, 1950 and shows title apparently vested in
J ..\. Stevenson and his wife, hy a quit claim deed in 19·±7.
There is no chain of title shown in the abstract or by
any other <>Yidence to estahlisht>d ownership by the def Pndant:-:, exc('pt their asserted rights under the quit
daim clt·<'d from l\f eCullough InvPstment Company (Ex.
umst

P-19).

Tlt<> rvtonl titl(' matter is set at rest once and for all,
m rim opinion, li:- resort to Plaintiffs' abstract of title
and Exhibit P-11. ~Ir. DaYid I. Gardner prepared this
after the dispute arose. He called it a "composite map of
.Jack 0. Coffin and Charles E. DeGraffenried pro1wrtic•s". He shows on the face that it utilizes the "Coffin
snrV('_\' 3-:.?/-3() and the DeGraffenried survey 9-18-62."
Each of tllL'H' suryeys is tied to the legal descriptions in
tht> J 93f) Coffin dPed and ] 9(il DeGraffenried deed as
tltP :-:am<· l'Plat<, to the East quart<•r (•onwr of S«ction 1-l-.

This is tlte re-established corner "-hich the Salt Lak(•
C'ocmty Snneyor fixed prior to 195G. This duty and
)lO\':er to"n•-<'stablish missing or obliterated government
I:n,,;-; and conwn~ in his county and 1wrpetuate the sallH'

hy suital1k 1110nmnents" is created hy 8L'ction 11-23-9
CC ..\. l!J.J;L 'l'hat the ohl conwr was lost, was shown
Ii.\- tlw sm·n·::or's ivsfonony. r1 1 he County Surveyor set a

"\:itm•:-:s <·01·1wr~' in th(• }()()()() South County Hoad and

lG
this was available and fixed befo.re either of the two
above noted deeds were issued.

la~t

Defendants' Quit Claim Deed, Exhibit P-19, has as
its place of beginning, ''at a point 3 chains :23 links \fp~t
and 10 links Korth from the 8outheast corner of tl1e
N oreast quarter of Sectionl-1, To1\-nship 3 8outl1, Hang,,
1 \Vest . . . ". Such is the identical placl• as the "Ea8l
quarter corner of Section 1-1". Prewrnably said det'd in
1961 must be read and interpreted ·with relat!cm to tl1l·
said government quarter co.rner.
Mr. David I. Gardner has drmrn E.xl1iliit P-11 mlll
followed the metes and bounds <lescriptions of boU1 cleecb.
The legal descriptions of the properties fit in ull i1articulars, except for a slight enor in closing on tlH· Defendants' deed. The significance of this must be recL'gnized by the Court as it would be by the County Hecor<ler
and the Co·unty AssPssor.

X o overlap exists. No conflict of lioundaries e.::i~t~
as a matter of record. The Defendants in lJl'qJarntion
for trial had a ~lr. Hoover Knowlton n'Slll'Yt·~- tJH~ pro11t>rty and prepare Exhibits D-L~ and D-~:~ usillg U1e olcl
'"row o.r trees", etc. as a gui<k. As shv\\ n in K'J1ihit D-~:.:
lu~ has 1n·ivately deciclC'cl that the ·we::it quartvr eorner
of 8ection 13 (presuma1Jly th(' f.'allle as 1.l1e Ea:~t qn:uh-1·
eorner of Hection 1-±) should he /(i.83 fed Sndlt awl
15.97 feet east of t11e eorm'l' sd !Jy the Salt Lal~(' C'o~rnt:1
S ll 1'VPyo 1'.
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Of course, he has no authority to reset the quarter
corner. He locates it "as intended by existing evidence
of property lines, etc.". By coincidence, his reconstructed
"intended" quarter corner would move Defendants' property southerly to include the two acres at issue.
·we submit that after the quarter corner has been
legally re-established by the County Surveyor and the
Defendants have acquired title by a separate conveyance, executed after said date and tied to the same
quartt>r cornt>r, no casual resurvey can alter the record
title• of the parties by tieing to rows of trees, etc., in
intermediate metes and bounds courses. In essence, Mr.
Knowlton has said to the Court that the Defendants'
deed did not start where it says it does because it would
be awkward to reconcile the row of trees at the other
Pnd of the described area.
If the Salt Lake County Surveyor erred in setting

the quarter corner, such could be corrected by proper
proceedings. A convenient substitute corner cannot be
dreamed up to meet the Defendants' special desires. This
is particularly true when the reeorded deeds, using the
true quarter corner, produce no conflict between the
parties (See Exhibit P-17).
POINT IV
NO BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE ISSUE

rs

PRESENT I~ THIS CASE.

18
Some confusion is interjected by Defendant:::;' l'l-'ferences in their brief to boundariPs l>y a('quieS('t'll('l'. They
"'ould have the Court believe that this new f('ll('l' t>lWted
in 19()3 \ms on tlw line of an okl P~tal>lislwd linP.
The fallacy of this approad1 may be

<kmon~trat(·d i11

many ways. The uwst obviom; is tlw evidl'l1<'(' tliat tlH·:1·
had been no fence line there for over twl nty ::.-<·ars lwfo11·
1

the Defendants bought the old flour mill. J f tl1<·n· l1wi
been an old corral for the horses usl d at the mill. :''111':1
went out with the advent of motor tnll'ks in 1!J~;> or 1!J:;i1
1

( unnmuberPd pagP lwt\reen R. 2-1-G and 2-t7).
Testimony i8 n ry positive that there \ms no frnr·1·
1

there. A conflid o.f evidence seems to have arisPll n11 tli >
factor. To have a boundary l>y ar<tlliPs(·rn·c· tlH· <kf(·1~da1;l'
had the burdl'n of proving all of ill<' <•ss<·nlial d!•11H·i.t~.
They have fail<><L
'l'he most that ean he said i8 that tltere \\'<'l'<' t\\n
old iron stakes out in th<> fi< ld. 8ome of d{'frnda11ts' O\rll
witnesses denied their l'Xistenrc'. \Yl10 put t!H•Jll tl1ere
is unclear. Defendants claim that su<'li rnarked \rl:<»«' tlw
old corral fenee had been. '1 1 l1is is d(•nied hy otlH'l' \rit1

TIPSSf'S.

In any <.:'Yl'nt, Uw reVl'l'Se of a lmnrnlary [Jy aequi(·~
eence has hePn proven l>~- the fads. Xo
at the elairne<l lo<"ation for

OYl'l'

ft'JL<'

Jiacl pxi:,;te,l

:20 yPars lw:·nn· dvi't·n-
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dants bought. This was an open field. Plaintiffs grazed
and cultivated the area without any restraint or restriction from 195:2 until defendants built their fence in 1963.
Had defendants' predecessors in title asserted ownership
surely they would have ousted plaintiffs during the
1952-19()3 period.
POINT V
THE FINDING AND JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT
ARE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.

In an appeal of this nature, the appellant must carry
the hurden o.f proving to this Supreme Court that the
trial Court's Findings and Judgment is not supported
Jiy competent evide>nce. Instead, they argue first that the
seven year statute does not apply but that this must be
controlled by the over 20 year rule relating to prescriptive rights. The ohviom; error of this approach is answered ahon'. 'The rtah Legislature in three separate sections has tied down the FWV(:'n year period as the appli<'ahl11 standard.
Defendants contention that no warnmg had been
p:ivPn that iilaintiffs wen~ paying the taxes is their next
hasis. 'l'h(• actual, open, notorious possession of plaintiffs
from 19.)J on is dt'tailed above. The tax payment tPsti1nony of plaintiffs was unchall(:'nged at the trial. After
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trial and by way of a motion for m'w trial oi· n·o1w11;n'.:
or something, d(_>fendants offrn•d to bring in a \riln:·~.'
from the Salt Lake County Assvssor's offiee to t1·stif;.
as to tax assessnwnts by c1Pfonda11tti and tlwir im·d1·c·bsors. This belat<>d offer was n•t;istC>d and n'j<'('k<l hy tJ1,.
Court. ~ o pf fort liad be(•n ma( le during the trial to sn11ply such proof an<l no valid eXl'llSe was pn•st>nkd for defendants not testifying as to thosp tax payllwnb. l\:
Exhibit :25 only the Yaluation ~ otie(•s for 1%:2 \1·t·1·
offered, no proof of payment. 1n fad ~Ir. D<•<i ra i'frmi1 ',
admittPd lw had not ti111Pl:-1iaid t]w tax1•s in 1%:l ( H. :..::,.; !.
The third point of attack by dd'<.•rnlanb is a < 011h,ntion that seven yt->ars had not pass<'d lidnn• tlw:
grabbed the two aer<-'S from plaintiffs. Tlu·:- rnust Jail
on this because Jilaintiffo took title• aml n•(·or<l:_•d tilt>ir
first de(•d in 195:2 and took pc,-.;s<>ssion tll<·n. Tlw t<•stirno;1:of David I. Gardner arnl tlw finding of tlH' trial <·ocu~
was that this initial eonv<»-anet> ( hd'>Y<·<·n Ht•(-i:sLva''.
Ditch and the .Jordan Hiv(•r) included the c•ntire trn'a
in rontention. Thus, thPre was of n·c·<!rd arnl tliPn· \1 a~
demonstrah•d by actual pos<·ssion, the O\\'lll'rship aml
rights of plaintiffs from l!l~J:.! on to tillH' o-l' trial.
1

Point four of <l<jfonJants is tlJp liland elailtl 1>f pa:· uwnt of all ta.xes h,v <l<·frndm11-s. As a11s\n•n•d alioY<', tlii~
,,·as not prm-en, during- trial. ']'he A:;sv:-;sor\; reconl."
off<>red aft<'r trial, (·Y<'ll if n·t·<•:\·<·rl, \\'(!lll<l not J>l'll'.l'
1Jay1m·nt of taxPs 1>.'" any part:.· \.-itliin th· ti1;1(• o;· 1~1amwr
n·qnin•d hy hrn·.
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The last Point in the brief is a lament that the physical facts belie the description in the decree. Here they
ding- to the proposition that their 19Gl deed does not
really mean to start where it says it does because their
re-surYey before trial would change the location of the
r1uarter eonwr. Assuming, without admitting, that their
latest survey tied to rows of trees, etc. wo.uld accommodate their title elaims, yet they have not expressed a
singlP liasis for reversing the trial court.
The Jenee, among other things, quiets title in Plaintiffs hecause the~· had been in open and notorious ad-verse
possPssion undPr a \\Titten instrument from the time of
tlic·ir <let>cl in 193:2 and had paid the ta.x:es assessed thereon. This finding presupposes that the title might have
been in some conflict before but no\v has been quieted in
Plaintiffs lwcausP of the statutory grounds.
It is interesting to note that the record titles of Plain-

tiffs and Defrndants do not in fact overlap or conflict.
We'yp demonstrated such by Exhibit P-17 as drawn by

Mr. David I. Ganhwr. r:L'he abstract in Plaintiffs' propPrty, (Exhibit P-13) contains a plat at the end thereof
whiC'h also visually demonstrates the absence of ovPrlap.
Y nu an, invited to read each dt>scription by metes and

hounds an<l traee such on the P-17 composite map and on
thr> alistract plat and to verify thes(• facts. Defenclanb
hay,. not

P\'Pl1

in·ov('ll a n'cord titlP to any an•a.

So we see that the Findings and Decree are in faet
fully supported by competent evidence. No valid basis
for any reversal has been presented by DefendantR.

CONCLUSION
The Defendants bought with knowledge of Plaintiffs'
possession, and refused to believe their surveyor, Brad
Gardner, when he set their boundary stakes in 19G2.
Rather they chose to rely on what an "old miller" tol<l
them about where an old corral fence had been many,
many years before and so erected the fence. In doing so
they took the law in their own hands and exprnpriatecl
from Plaintiffs two acres.
The Trial Court has made careful and proper Findings and its judgment quieting title back in the Plaintiffa
Modest damages were a wared to Plaintiffs also. ?\ o legal
or equitable grounds for reversal have been demonstrated
by the Defendants.
Respectfully sulm1ittc•d

HARRY D. PUGSLEY
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES,

RAMPrroN & \V ArrKISN
for Plaintiffs
and Hespondenh;
(j()() T~l Paso Natural Gas Blcli-;.
Salt Lake City, Utali

Attonw~-

